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Mind Games
A Reply to Daniela Hill
Chris Eliasmith
In her discussion of my original article, Hill reconstructs an argument I may have
been making, argues that the distinction between natural and artificial minds is
not exclusive,  and suggests that my reliance on behaviour as a determiner of
“mindedness” is a dangerous slip back to philosophical behaviourism. In reply, I
note that the logical fallacy of which I’m accused (circular reasoning) is not the
one present in the reconstruction of my argument (besides the point), and offer a
non-fallacious reconstruction. More importantly, I note that logical analysis does
not seem appropriate for the discussion in the target article. I then agree that
natural and artificial minds do not make up two discrete categories for minded-
ness. Finally, I note that my research program belies any behaviourist motivations,
and reiterate that even though behaviour is typically important for identifying
minds, I do not suggest that it is a substitute for theory. However, the target art-
icle is not about such theory, but about the near-term likelihood of sophisticated
artificial minds
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1 Introduction
I think Hill is right to wonder aloud about my
methodology in the target article.  After all,  I
just ignored the hard philosophical issue of say-
ing what minds really are. I pretended (some-
what  self-consciously)  that  we  all  know what
minds are, and so that we will simply be able to
tell when someone has created one, if they ever
do. But, I did that for a reason. The reason was
this: I did not want to get lost in the minutiae
of metaphysics when my focus was on a techno-
logical  revolution—one  with  significant  philo-
sophical consequences (which is also not to say I
don’t  like  such  minutiae  in  their  proper  time
and place).
2 A failure of logic
However, Hill was also not especially taken by
the reasons I provided for expecting such devel-
opments either. Hill’s suggestion is that the best
reasonable argument you could construct from
my  original  considerations  was  fallacious.
Though, Hill is quick to point out that I didn’t
take myself to be constructing an argument: “…
not to claim that Eliasmith really argues for the
emergence of artificial minds” (this collection, p.
4).
Nevertheless,  her analysis is  that what I
have provided is  best  understood as a  petitio
principii  (aka circular argument):  “this means
that the conclusion drawn at the end of the ar-
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gumentative line is identical with at least one of
the implicit premises” (Hill this collection, p. 4).
Unfortunately, the technical analysis offered (p.
5) is a non sequitur (i.e., there is no logical con-
nection between the premises and conclusion).
Regardless, one fallacy is as embarassing as the
other.
However,  I’d  like  to  suggest  that  if  we
wanted to recast the original paper as a logical
argument, then a simple modus ponens will do:
if we have a good theory and the technological
innovations necessary to implement the theory,
then  we  can  build  a  minded  agent.  We have
good (and improving) theory and will have the
proper technological innovations (in the next 50
years),  therefore  we  will  be  able  to  build  a
minded agent  (in  the  next  50  years).  Indeed,
most of the paper is arguing for the plausibility
of these premises.
More to the point, however, I think that
we can take this as an object lesson for when lo-
gical inference is really just the wrong kind of
analysis of a paper. Instead of trying to provide
a logical  argument from which the conclusion
necessarily  follows  from  the  premises,  I  am
providing series of considerations that I believe
make the conclusion likely given both the cur-
rent state of affairs, and expected changes. In
short, I think of the original paper as providing
something more like a series of inferences to the
best explanation: all  of which are,  technically,
fallacious; and all of which are directed at es-
tablishing premises.
3 Back to minds
Despite disagreeing with the analysis of the lo-
gical structure of the paper, I do appreciate the
emphasis that Hill has placed on philosophical
and ethical aspects of our attempts to construct
minds. In the original article, I only very briefly
touch  on  those  issues.  However,  I  would  be
quick  to  point  out  that  I  do  not  think,  and
never intended to suggest, that the distinction
between “natural” and “artificial minds” was an
absolute, “exhaustive,” or “exclusive” one (Hill
this collection, p. 3). Like most interesting and
complex features, possession of ‘mindedness’ no
doubt comes in degrees. In fact, I think that our
attempts  to  construct  artificial  minds  will
provide a much better sense of the dimensions
along which such a continuum is best defined.
Finally, I must admit that I find it some-
what alarming that I’m being characterized as a
behaviourist in Hill’s article—that has definitely
never happened before:  “Let us see how Elia-
smith characterizes artificial minds. One can see
this as a judgment based on the similarity of
behaviour originating from two types of agents:
humans  and  artificial”  (this collection,  p.  5).
Hence,  I  was  espousing  “analytical  behavior-
ism… a failed  philosophical  research  program”
(Hill this collection, p. 6). Indeed, I, like all be-
havioural  scientists,  believe  that  behaviour  is
one important metric for characterizing the sys-
tems of interest. However, the reason I focus on
internal mechanisms in my own research – all
the way down to the neural – is that I believe
those  mechanisms  give  us  critical  additional
constraints for identifying the right class of al-
gorithms  that  give  rise  to  behaviours.  Con-
sequently, I wholeheartedly agree with Hill that
“There could be much more to mindedness than
behaviour” (this collection, p. 6). So, for the re-
cord, I believe that our best theories for how to
build minds are going to be highly informed by
low-level mechanisms.
That  being  said,  I  also  think that  most
people’s judgments of whether or not something
counts as being minded is going to come down
largely to their being convinced of the natural-
ness, or “cognitiveness” of the behaviour that is
exhibited by agents we construct.  Notice that
there  is  a  difference  between a  claim of  how
people  will  judge  mindedness,  and  a  claim
about theories of mindedness or how we ought
to best achieve that judgment. Turing was, after
all, onto something with his test.
4 Conclusion
I  noted in  the  original  article  (Eliasmith this
collection) that I was attempting to avoid be-
coming  mired  in  tangential  debates  regarding
what it is to have a mind by simplifying the cri-
teria for mindedness (for the purposes of that
article). Exactly the kinds of debates I was at-
tempting to avoid are raised in Hill’s comment-
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ary. For example, I don’t think we know if there
is  a  clean  contrast  between  a  “fully  minded
agent” and a “merely cognitive agent” (Hill this
collection, p. 6). Perhaps there is, and perhaps
it is that a fully minded agent can “experience
herself  as a cognitive agent”, (Hill this collec-
tion, p. 6) but perhaps not. This does not strike
me as a decidable question at present. 
So,  perhaps  my unwillingness  to  venture
into the murky waters  of  necessary and suffi-
cient conditions for having a mind came off as
making  me  look  like  a  behaviourist.  But  in
truth,  my  purpose  was  rather  to  focus  on
providing a variety of evidence that I think sug-
gests that artificial minds are not as far away as
some have assumed. There is, I believe, a histor-
ically  unique confluence of  theory,  technology,
and capital happening as we speak.
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